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This paper examines asset dynamics for husband-owned, wife-owned, and jointly owned assets, using 
unique longitudinal survey data from rural Bangladesh. Nonparametric and parametric methods are used 
to examine the shape of the dynamic asset frontier, the number of equilibria, and whether land and 
nonland asset stocks converge to such equilibria. The paper also investigates the differential impact of 
negative shocks and positive events on husbands’, wives’, and jointly owned assets. Husbands’ and 
wives’ asset stocks are drawn down for different kinds of shocks, with husbands’ assets being liquidated 
in response to death of a household member and dowry and wedding expenses, and both husbands’ and 
wives’ assets being negatively affected by illness shocks. The paper concludes by drawing out 
implications for the design of gender-sensitive social protection mechanisms. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Households in developing countries use a variety of mechanisms to cope with shocks. While households 
employ a range of ex ante and ex post coping mechanisms such as drawing down assets (that is, 
employing a risk management mechanism that was put into place ex ante), accessing capital markets, 
reallocating labor, and receiving private or public transfers (examples of ex post responses), asset disposal 
is often used as a last resort, because irreversible asset losses may put the household at risk of future 
poverty. The responsiveness of asset holdings to shocks and positive events is therefore of interest to 
policymakers because of its implications for the evolution of household poverty and well-being over time. 
Recent work on assets and poverty traps in developing countries has used household-level panel 
data on asset holdings to distinguish between structurally and stochastically poor households and to 
identify whether a bifurcation point exists at which assets tend toward high- or low-level equilibria 
(Carter and May 2001; Lybbert et al. 2004; Carter and Barrett 2006; Barrett et al. 2006; Carter et al. 2007; 
among others). While earlier work on Sub-Saharan Africa has found evidence for multiple equilibrium 
asset poverty traps, more recent work across a more diverse range of countries does not support this (Jalan 
and Ravallion 2004; Naschold 2006, 2008). Quisumbing and Baulch (2009) hypothesize that, in the 
context of rural Bangladesh, well-functioning factor markets facilitate consumption smoothing and 
informal insurance mechanisms protect households against short-term shocks. However, the persistence 
of large numbers of rural Bangladeshi households with minimal asset holdings is consistent with the 
existence of an underclass of chronically poor households. Moreover, there are indications that capital 
markets may work against the landless, and the exclusion of women from labor markets and other market-
oriented activities may create different livelihood strategies for men and women. Given the history of 
gender discrimination in Bangladesh, it is likely that differential access to credit and labor markets leads 
to different asset dynamics for men and women in rural Bangladesh. 
The existence of different asset dynamics for men and women is consistent with the growing 
empirical evidence that risk is not shared equally within the household. For example, Dercon and 
Krishnan (2000) tested whether individual illness shocks affect the evolution of body mass index, 
controlling for a variety of confounding factors. They find that although risk is shared efficiently in most 
of the Ethiopian highlands, poor women fare worst in the southern part of the country, where customary 
laws on settlement at divorce are biased against women. Duflo and Udry (2003) also reject the hypothesis 
of complete insurance within households in Côte d’Ivoire. Conditional on overall levels of expenditure, 
the composition of household expenditure is sensitive to the gender of the recipient of a rainfall shock. 
Rainfall shocks that increase the yields of women’s crops shift expenditure toward food. However, strong 
social norms constrain the use of profits from yam cultivation, which is carried out almost exclusively by 
men. In line with these norms, rainfall-induced fluctuations in income from yams are transmitted to 
expenditures on education and food, not to expenditures on private goods. In Ghana, spouses do not co-
insure; women pool their risk with other women in the village, while men have a wider and less defined 
risk pool (Goldstein 1999). Indeed, transfers from the spouse and the extended family are not responsive 
to shocks, while those from nonfamily friends are. A study of pastoralist societies in Ethiopia and Kenya 
suggests not only that shocks matter, but also that perceptions of shocks matter (Doss, McPeak, and 
Barrett 2008). Men and women may differ in their perception of the nature of a shock, the severity of the 
shock, and the appropriate coping mechanisms to be used. Price fluctuations may also affect gendered 
asset accumulation. In Nigeria, Dillon and Quiñones (2011) find that the evolution of prices over a 20-
year period reinforced gender asset inequality. Men primarily held larger livestock with larger unit values 
and benefited from price increases in high-value livestock, while women held lower-value livestock and 
thus did not experience the same degree of appreciation of their asset stocks. 
There is also substantial evidence, particularly from the anthropological literature, that men and 
women have different asset accumulation strategies, and that men’s and women’s assets are used in 
different ways to cope with shocks. In Thailand, Antonopoulos and Floro (2005) find that women tend to 
keep more of their individual assets in real (tangible) forms rather than in a financial form, because  
2 
keeping assets in real form, such as jewelry, gives them more control over asset use. In Indonesia, 
Frankenberg, Smith, and Thomas (2003) show that jewelry traditionally serves as a buffer asset for 
consumption smoothing since it can be easily pawned or sold, even if women consider distress sales of 
jewelry shameful in the Bangladeshi context (White 1992, 133). Indeed, gold, mostly in the form of 
jewelry, was often sold to cope with the recent Indonesian economic crisis (Frankenberg, Smith, and 
Thomas 2003). 
This paper uses the Carter and Barrett dynamic assets framework as a point of departure for 
investigating gender-differentiated asset dynamics and responses to shocks in rural Bangladesh. In 
particular, using a unique longitudinal survey covering around 750 households located in three case-
control intervention study sites in rural Bangladesh, it investigates the following questions: 
1.  Are asset dynamics different for jointly and exclusively held assets?  
2.  Is the impact of negative events and processes different on male-, female-, and jointly held 
assets? To what extent are these mitigated by positive events?  
3.  Do different types of shocks contribute to gender asset inequality?  
4.  Are men and women with better access to social networks better able to accumulate assets? 
This paper attempts to answer these questions using both nonparametric and parametric 
(regression-based) methods, which are outlined in the next section of the paper. Section 3 describes the 
unique longitudinal survey of rural Bangladesh used in this study, together with baseline household 
characteristics, baseline livelihood strategies, the incidence of shocks, and the trends in asset stocks 
observed over the 10-year interval spanned by the survey. Section 4 discusses the empirical specification. 
Section 5 presents nonparametric results using LOWESS (locally weighted scatterplot smoothing) plots, 
and Section 6 then examines the impact of individual and household characteristics, shocks, and initial 
asset ownership on land and asset growth, examining the impacts of different types of shocks, looking at 
different types of assets, and, finally, performing an indicative analysis of the role of social networks in 
asset accumulation. Section 7 concludes with a summary of the results and a discussion of the 
implications for the design of gender-sensitive social protection mechanisms.  
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2.  METHODOLOGY 
In a series of recent papers, Michael Carter, Christopher Barrett, and others have developed a theory of 
(dynamic) poverty traps and tested it empirically using data from Sub-Saharan Africa.
1 Observing that it 
is usually much easier to measure assets than either consumption expenditures or incomes, Barrett and 
Carter develop a theory of asset dynamics and dynamic poverty traps that can be applied to longitudinal 
data on asset stocks. Parametric and nonparametric methods are used to derive a dynamic asset path that 
shows the typical relationship between asset holdings in two periods, usually a number of years apart. 
Typically, as shown in Figure 2.1, the dynamic asset path has an elongated S-shape with three equilibria 
at the points where the dynamic asset path intersects the diagonal: a stable low-level equilibrium (A
L), an 
unstable mid-level equilibrium (A
*), and a stable high-level equilibrium (A
H). This leads to a prediction 
that households’ asset trajectories will bifurcate, with those households that start off with asset levels 
above A
* accumulating assets over time and tending toward the stable high-level equilibrium. Meanwhile, 
households with assets below the unstable equilibrium decumulate their initial assets and tend toward the 
stable low-level equilibrium. This implies that some households will tend toward a persistently (or 
chronically) poor state, while other households will tend toward relative affluence. 
Figure 2.1—Carter and Barrett’s theory of asset dynamics and poverty traps 
 
Source: Carter and Barrett (2006). 
The dynamic asset path represents the central tendency of the asset recursion function (Naschold 
2006). Dynamic asset paths can be estimated using a variety of nonparametric and parametric methods, 
although, given the inherent nonlinearity hypothesized by the theory, nonparametric methods usually 
provide the best fit. LOWESS, as proposed by Cleveland (1979), is used for nonparametric estimation. 
Despite its computational intensity, LOWESS is attractive compared to other nonparametric methods 
such as kernel regression, as it uses a variable bandwidth, which is robust against outliers, and uses a local 
line or polynomial estimator to minimize boundary problems (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). However, 
such methods do impose continuity on the dynamic asset path.
2 
Most, if not all, studies that have estimated dynamic asset frontiers have estimated these for 
households, owing to the paucity of longitudinal data on individually held assets. However, if resources—
                                                       
1 See, inter alia, Carter and Barrett (2006), Barrett et al. (2006), and Lybbert et al. (2004). This exposition draws heavily 
from Quisumbing and Baulch (2009). 
2 This is not the innocuous assumption it may first appear, as it rules out the sort of discontinuities (jumps) in the asset 
frontier that might characterize poverty traps. However, testing for such discontinuities is a complex estimation problem (Hansen 










including assets—are not pooled within the household, it is possible that males and females within the 
household may have gender-specific dynamic asset frontiers that differ from the household asset frontier. 
Focusing on the time path of individually accumulated assets is important if there is a nonzero risk of 
marital dissolution (whether through death or divorce) and if the surviving spouse is not adequately 
protected by legal guarantees or social norms. 
The extent of asset pooling within households probably varies across cultures, with spouses 
pooling most assets in some cultures and having separate asset ownership in others. In Bangladesh, 
although spouses clearly have some concept of joint assets, there is reason to believe that resource 
pooling is incomplete; previous work on assets at marriage indicates that men’s and women’s assets have 
different effects on household resource allocation, with women’s assets increasing expenditure shares on 
education (Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003) and improving girls’ health relative to boys’ (Hallman 2000). 
Similar to previous work estimating dynamic asset frontiers, the following nonparametric 
equation is estimated: 
AiT = ß (AiB) + εit  i = j, h, w,  (1) 
where AB and AT are assets at the baseline (B) and the most recent survey period (T), and i indexes the 
owner of the asset, whether joint (j), husband (h), or wife (w). The analogous parametric regression is 
  AiT = (1 + α)AiB + θit ,  (2) 
which is estimated in differenced form as 
  AiT – AiB = αAiB + θit .  (3) 
A dynamic equilibrium implies that, at least in expectation, asset stocks do not change over time, that is,  
  E[AiT – AiB] = 0.  (4) 
Suppose there is a level of assets Ai* that represents a dynamic equilibrium. For Ai* to be a stable 
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  (6) 
where AiT - Ait is asset growth for owner i in household j from the baseline survey period (B) to the most 
recent survey (T), AiB is assets at the baseline, Zi and Cj are time-invariant household and community 
characteristics, and εit is the error term. This specification, which resembles that used by Barrett et al. 
(2006) and Naschold (2006), allows for convergence to be tested in two ways. First, a strong test of 
convergence would be to reject β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = 0 in favor of -2 < β1 ≤ 0 and β2 = β3 = β4 = 0. That 
would imply a unique, stable dynamic equilibrium in which less-wealthy asset owners’ asset stocks grow 
faster until they reach the equilibrium, while the asset growth of wealthier owners slows down. Second, a 
weaker test of convergence is if the expected value of change in log assets is nonnegative and the first 
derivative of the expected change in log assets with respect to lagged assets is negative at the point where 
E[.] = 0 and the first derivative is greater than -1; otherwise the equilibrium would not be stable.
3 This 
                                                       
3 Note that because of the higher-order polynomial terms, the derivative must be evaluated throughout the conditioning 
domain.  
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weaker test implies local convergence but not necessarily a stable or unique equilibrium, since the 
function could diverge before reaching the global maximum. However, this can be checked by repeating 
the test at different percentiles of the lagged asset distribution. Similar to the test performed by 
Quisumbing and Baulch (2009), this test is conducted at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles of 
the lagged asset distribution for each category of asset owner. 
Another issue is the extent to which different shocks affect men’s and women’s asset 
accumulation (or decumulation) behavior, and whether the impact of shocks differs across asset types. If 
men and women have different types of assets in their portfolios—men, for example, holding more land 
and agricultural equipment, and women holding more jewelry and small livestock—one would expect 
shocks to have different impacts on different asset types, depending on who owns the asset and the 
relative ease with which assets can be acquired and sold. If women’s assets are smaller and more easily 
disposed of, shocks could increase, rather than decrease, gender asset inequality within the household.  
Finally, there is much interest in the role of social networks and collective action in enabling the 
poor to reduce their vulnerability. Participation in collective action, particularly formal membership in 
groups, has increasingly been promoted by development practitioners as a way for the asset poor to invest 
in another type of asset—social capital. In Bangladesh, where women have traditionally owned fewer 
assets than men, development programs that build women’s social capital by working through women’s 
groups have been shown to help women build up their stocks of physical assets (Kumar and Quisumbing 
2010). 
Thus, this paper also attempts to investigate whether husbands’ and wives’ access to social 
networks helps them and their families accumulate land and assets. By identifying the different types of 
shocks to which men and women are vulnerable, and the factors that are protective against such shocks, 
this paper hopes to contribute to the development of gender-sensitive social protection mechanisms.  
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3.  DATA AND DESCRIPTIVES 
Survey Design 
The longitudinal study on which this paper is based builds on three surveys conducted by IFPRI in 
Bangladesh to evaluate the impacts of microfinance, new vegetable and polyculture fish technologies, and 
the introduction of educational transfers. The original evaluations surveyed 1,787 households and 102 
villages located in 14 of Bangladesh’s 64 districts and were set up with intervention and comparison 
groups. These districts and villages were selected to span the range of agroecological conditions found in 
rural Bangladesh, and, although the sample cannot be described as representative in a statistical sense, it 
does broadly characterize the variability of livelihoods found in rural Bangladesh. These same households 
were resurveyed in 2006/07 as part of an integrated qualitative and quantitative study on the determinants 
and consequences of chronic poverty; further details on the study are found in Quisumbing (2010), Davis 
(2007), and Baulch and Davis (2008).
4  
The analysis in this paper uses the data collected in the second (quantitative) phase of the study. 
The household survey took place from November 2006 to March 2007, coinciding roughly with the same 
agricultural season as one of the original survey rounds, and covered 2,152 households, of which 1,787 
were core households that took part in the original survey and 365 were splits from original households. 
The household survey questionnaire was designed to be comparable across sites and also to facilitate 
comparability with the original questionnaire from the evaluation studies. A community-level 
questionnaire was also administered to key informants at this stage to obtain basic information on each 
village and changes in the community and important institutions within the community since the last 
survey round.  
Since this paper focuses on growth of husbands’ and wives’ assets between the baseline and the 
2006/07 survey rounds, the analysis sample consists of a subsample of those households that were 
reinterviewed, consisting of core households (originally interviewed households) for whom data on 
individually owned assets in both the baseline and 2006/07 rounds and for husbands and wives within the 
same household exist.
5 Because gender-disaggregated asset data were collected only in the agricultural 
technology site at the baseline, analysis of individual and joint asset dynamics is possible only with data 
from the agricultural technology study site.  
The agricultural technology study originally surveyed 47 villages in three sites in Bangladesh in 
1996/97, with each site chosen as part of an impact evaluation of programs disseminating new agricultural 
technologies. Commercial vegetable technologies were being disseminated in Saturia thana, Manikganj 
district (referred to below as Saturia); polyculture fish production technologies were being provided in 
two sites, Jessore Sadar thana, Jessore district (referred to below as Jessore); and Gaffargaon thana, 
Mymensingh district, and Pakundia and Kishoreganj Sadar thanas, Kishoreganj district (collectively 
referred to as Mymensingh below), in combination with specific extension programs for disseminating 
these technologies. Saturia and Mymensingh are located in the central part of Bangladesh, whereas 
Jessore is in the west, close to Calcutta and the Indian border. In two sites (Saturia and Jessore), 
technologies were being introduced through nongovernmental organization (NGO) programs targeted 
exclusively to women, who were provided training and credit. At the third site (Mymensingh), the 
Mymensingh Aquaculture Extension Project (MAEP) and 15 Department of Fisheries extension agents 
provided training to relatively better-off households, and training with credit to relatively poorer 
households; this training was directed at both men and women, but men participated more often than 
women. The primary distinction between the two polyculture fish production sites is that in Jessore the 
NGO (Banchte Shekha) had arranged long-term leases of ponds that are managed by groups of women 
                                                       
4 The dataset is publicly available at http://www.ifpri.org/dataset/chronic-poverty-and-long-term-impact-study-bangladesh. 
5 Household asset dynamics are analyzed in Quisumbing and Baulch (2009), using the full sample from all three 
intervention sites.  
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(ranging in number from 5 to 20). In Mymensingh, ponds are owned and managed by single households 
or households that have shared ownership.  
About 93.7 percent of original households were reinterviewed, implying an overall attrition rate 
of 6.3 percent between the baseline and the 2006/07 survey round. Attrition rates across survey sites 
differ, ranging from a low attrition rate of 4 percent in the improved vegetables site to 11.1 percent in the 
individual fishponds site, over the 10-year survey interval.
6 Attrition rates for intact couples—husbands 
and wives who remained married to each other and who were reinterviewed—were higher, at 17 percent 
over the 10-year interval between surveys. Because attrition bias may affect coefficient estimates, all 
regression estimates in this paper are corrected for attrition using inverse probability weights (Fitzgerald, 
Gottschalk, and Moffitt 1998). 
Household Characteristics and Asset Trends 
Bangladesh experienced impressive rates of poverty reduction from the mid-1990s up to the onset of the 
food price crisis in 2007. While these data are not nationally representative, comparisons of per capita 
consumption and poverty in the baseline survey and in 2006/07 show definite increases in per capita 
consumption and impressive reductions in poverty.
7 Table 3.1 presents per capita consumption 
expenditures, poverty transition categories, and baseline household characteristics of core households in 
the agricultural technology site. All monetary values are in 2007 taka, converted using the consumer price 
index.
8 In the agricultural technology sites, poverty incidence declined from 70 percent in 1996 to 18 
percent in 2006/07 (an average yearly reduction of 5.2 percentage points). Consistent with the decline in 
poverty incidence, movements of previously poor households across the poverty threshold were 
substantial, with 54 percent of households in the agricultural technology sites moving out of poverty. 
Despite these substantially and statistically significant reductions in poverty, 16 percent of households in 
the agricultural technology sites had per capita consumption expenditures below the poverty line in both 
periods, or are chronically poor. Even if their conditions may have improved, they have not improved 
sufficiently to raise their per capita consumption above the poverty line. 
Heads of the core households were around 45 years old during the baseline, with a very low 
percentage of female-headed households (4 percent). As of the baseline, households in the agricultural 
technology sites had an average of 5.69 co-resident individuals. Most household heads had very little 
schooling, with only about 38 percent of household heads having completed four or more years of 
schooling.
9 Average schooling attainment in the agricultural technology site was low, at 3.09 years; the 
average area of land owned was 148.49 decimals, which is skewed by Mymensingh, an area with 
relatively large landholding sizes.
10 Almost 40 percent of households are considered functionally landless, 
which in the Bangladeshi context is defined as owning less than 50 decimals of land (Hossain et al. 2007). 
   
                                                       
6 The attrition rates compare quite favorably to the longitudinal datasets reviewed in Alderman et al. (2001), where attrition 
rates range from 6 to 50 percent between two survey rounds and 1.5 to 23.2 percent per year between survey rounds. While 
resources to track all splits that had migrated to other districts were not available, names and addresses of migrants were obtained 
from their parents or neighbors. All in all, about 75 percent of household splits were traced and interviewed. Details on 
computing the attrition correction at the household level are in Quisumbing (2010).  
7 See Quisumbing (2010) for a definition of the consumption variable used in this paper. 
8 Note that since the number of valid observations on assets differs slightly from the number with valid observations on 
consumption expenditures, there may be slight differences between the numbers here and those reported in Quisumbing (2010). 
9 All household characteristics are evaluated as of the baseline, but monetary values are expressed in 2007 taka for 
comparability, since the baseline surveys for each study site took place in different years. 
10 100 decimals = 1 acre (or 0.4047 hectare).  
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Table 3.1—Characteristics of households in agricultural technology sites 
  Agricultural technology site 
   Mean   Standard deviation 
Number of panel households in asset growth analysis
a  (879) 
Per capita expenditures and poverty incidence   
  Per capita expenditure in baseline survey  960.48  549.61 
  Per capita expenditures in 2006/07  1,485.69  754.75 
  Whether poor in baseline survey  0.70  0.46 
  Whether poor in 2006/07  0.18  0.39 
Poverty transition category     
  Chronic poor  0.16  0.37 
  Falling into poverty  0.02  0.15 
  Moving out of poverty  0.54  0.50 
  Nonpoor  0.28  0.45 
Characteristics in baseline survey     
  Age of household head  44.80  12.75 
  Whether female-headed household  0.04  0.20 
  Education of household head (years of schooling)  3.09  4.00 
  Household head has at least 4 years of schooling  0.38  0.49 
  Area of land owned at baseline (in decimals)  148.49  207.95 
  Whether functionally landless (< 50 decimals)  0.38  0.49 
  Household size  5.69  2.77 
  Percent males 0–4 years  4.86  9.73 
  Percent females 0–4 years  4.74  9.33 
  Percent males 5–14 years  13.53  14.50 
  Percent females 5–14 years  11.50  13.62 
  Percent males 55 years and over  4.81  8.97 
  Percent females 55 years and over  4.15  9.04 
Source: CPRC-DATA-IFPRI Long-Term Impact Study. 
Note:
 a These households had valid observations on land and assets in both survey rounds.  
Households’ self-reported livelihood strategies were centered around agriculture at baseline 
(Table 3.2), albeit with marked gender differences. Forty-five percent of male household members 15 
years of age and older said that their primary occupation was in agriculture, whether they were self-
employed or working as agricultural wage workers. Nonagricultural self-employment, wage work, or 
salary work accounted for the primary occupation of around 35 percent of adult male household members. 
Around 17 percent of adult males were in neither sector, since they were students, unemployed, retired, 
beggars, or invalids. In contrast, women’s livelihoods revolved around the home: almost 80 percent of 
adult females said that they were engaged in domestic work within the home, even if they may have had 
their own small enterprises, reared livestock, or cultivated home gardens.
11 
   
                                                       
11 Women may tend to underestimate their own involvement in agricultural activities. Women report themselves as being 
engaged in domestic work, even if, by sample design, at least two-thirds of the sample households participated in NGO-led 
agricultural production programs that were targeted at women.  
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Table 3.2—Primary occupations of household members 15 years of age and older, by site, 
percent distribution 
  Males  Females 
Agriculture     
  Agriculture, self-employed  35.48  1.13 
  Agricultural wage labor  9.85  0.28 
Nonagriculture     
  Nonagriculture, self-employed  16.53  3.02 
  Nonagricultural wage labor  8.10  1.04 
  Salaried or skilled workers  10.85  2.83 
Domestic work, including servants  0.50  79.72 
Not employed     
  Students  13.69  8.40 
  Unemployed  1.25  0.09 
  Retired  0.50  0.00 
  Beggars and invalids   1.84  2.83 
  Others  1.42  0.66 
Source: CPRC-DATA-IFPRI Long-Term Impact Study. 
Consistent with the large long-term reduction in poverty, sample households built up and 
diversified their asset stocks over time (Table 3.3). The nonland asset measure includes livestock, 
productive assets (agricultural equipment and nonagricultural business assets), consumer durables, 
vehicles, and jewelry, but excludes monetary savings, loans given to others, the value of food stocks, 
owner-occupied housing, and trees. Because land markets may be imperfect and land may be less easily 
bought and sold compared to nonland assets, land is not included in the asset aggregate; however, the 
amount of land owned is controlled for in the regression analysis. The nonparametric analysis of poverty 
traps in Section 5 is conducted using two separate categories of assets—land and total nonland assets—
and three separate categories of asset ownership—joint, husband’s, and wife’s assets. In Section 6, a 
parametric analysis of the same asset categories is conducted, looking more closely at the responsiveness 
of assets to negative shocks and positive events, and at more disaggregated asset categories. 
Although land is an important asset for agricultural households and is a strong predictor of 
movement out of poverty or of never being poor (Quisumbing 2010), the area of owned land in both 
jointly owned and husband-owned categories has decreased over time. This reflects both a movement out 
of agriculture, mostly by men, into nonagricultural income-earning opportunities, as well as life-cycle 
processes in which parents retire from active farming and subdivide their land among their children 
(usually sons). Such decreases in the size of landholdings, particularly of owned land, are typically due to 
institutional factors such as partible inheritance (in which, upon his death, a father’s land is divided 
between the surviving sons) rather than market forces (Foster and Rosenzweig 2002). However, the area 
of women-owned land has increased by 39 percent, possibly as a result of NGO-led interventions that 
require land used for projects to be in women’s names. Indeed, it is possible that the reduction in jointly 
held land and the increase in wife-owned land may simply be a reclassification across these categories. 
For example, husband-owned cultivated area declined by 21 percent and jointly owned cultivated area by 
41.4 percent, but wife-owned cultivated area increased by 39.7 percent. Interestingly, however, the 
increase in women-owned homestead land, 44.5 percent, is higher than the decline in jointly held land 
(35.8 percent), suggesting that more than mere reclassification is taking place. 
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Table 3.3—Joint, husbands’, and wives’ land and asset holdings, 1996 and 2006/07, mean values in 2007 taka 
  1996    2006/07    Percentage change 
Joint  Husbands  Wives    Joint  Husbands  Wives    Joint  Husbands  Wives 
Landholdings (in decimals)                       
  Homestead  1.91  10.29  0.34    1.23  10.90  0.61    -35.8  5.8  44.5 
  Cultivated land  18.04  85.94  1.94    10.57  67.90  3.21    -41.4  -21.0  39.7 
  Other land  0.64  5.45  0.14    0.56  4.97  0.15    -11.7  -8.9  6.1 
  Size of owned land  20.59  101.68  2.42    12.36  83.76  3.98    -40.0  -17.6  39.2 
  Value of owned land (in 2007 
taka) 
50,118.71  254,806.20  6,129.03    63,802.00  508,112.00  22,846.08    27.3  99.4  73.2 
Nonland assets (in 2007 taka)                       
  Consumer durables  3,737.28  2,181.80  291.05    7,712.93  5,812.29  409.66    106.4  166.4  40.8 
  Agricultural durables  1,060.78  1,633.82  7.43    449.75  610.05  7.89    -57.6  -62.7  6.2 
  Nonagricultural durables  372.07  547.86  15.73    466.07  3,256.07  83.22    25.3  494.3  428.9 
  Jewelry  451.34  28.64  1,528.04    6,265.59  1,535.77  2,116.43    1,288.2  5,262.2  38.5 
  Poultry  73.94  13.06  493.36    247.88  144.71  206.86    235.2  1,007.9  -58.1 
  Other livestock  2,765.98  5,755.99  1,168.96    5,709.85  8,943.86  924.97    106.4  55.4  -20.9 
  Total livestock  2,839.92  5,769.06  1,662.33    5,957.73  9,088.57  1,131.83    109.8  57.5  -31.9 
  Total value of nonland assets  5,621.46  4,392.12  1,842.26    14,894.35  11,214.18  2,617.20    165.0  155.3  42.1 
Source: Author’s computations based on survey data. 
Notes: This table is based on 904 households with valid observations in both years. Joint assets are those identified as joint assets in the interview; each spouse’s holdings consist 




In contrast to the decline in landholding sizes (albeit not land values, which have increased over 
time), households in the agricultural technology sites nearly doubled their nonland asset holdings, 
growing from a baseline value of 27,040 taka (in 2007 prices) to 49,730 taka, an average asset growth rate 
of about 8 percentage points per year. Changes in the composition of the asset portfolio accompanied 
increases in asset holdings. For jointly held assets, the top three categories were consumer durables, 
livestock, and agricultural durables at baseline; by 2006/07, the most important assets were consumer 
durables, jewelry, and livestock. Livestock, consumer durables, and agricultural durables were the most 
important in husbands’ asset portfolios at baseline; 10 years later, the portfolio composition had shifted 
somewhat, with livestock the most important, followed by consumer durables and nonagricultural 
durables. Wives’ asset portfolios at baseline leaned toward livestock, jewelry, and consumer durables; in 
2006/07, these remained the most important assets, although with differing degrees of importance, with 
jewelry ranked first, followed by livestock and consumer durables.  
Growth rates of asset categories differed across ownership types. The fastest-growing asset in 
both jointly and husband-owned categories was jewelry, reflecting the desirability of gold as a household 
investment as well as fathers’ desires to build up dowries for their daughters. Although jewelry is 
traditionally considered a woman’s asset in Bangladesh, the value of jewelry exclusively owned by wives 
grew by less than 40 percent, while the value of jewelry exclusively owned by husbands or jointly owned 
grew much more dramatically. Although these disparities raise issues of reporting bias and attribution of 
ownership, jewelry clearly remains an important store of value in Bangladesh. 
Investment in nonagricultural durables also increased, indicating diversification to nonfarm 
income-generating activities. Most of this growth is reported in husband- and wife-owned nonagricultural 
durables, not joint property, possibly indicating that men and women are pursuing their own separate 
nonagricultural enterprises. This is the fastest-growing category of women-owned assets. At all sites, 
households reduced their holdings of agricultural durable equipment (reflected in reductions in jointly 
owned and husband-owned agricultural durables), possibly because of diversification out of agriculture, 
although wives increased their holdings of agricultural durables. 
Despite the rapid growth in wives’ asset holdings, most assets within the household are either 
held jointly or controlled by the husband (Table 3.4). In both survey periods, more than 80 percent of 
owned land was controlled by the husband, and between 2 to 4 percent controlled by the wife. The 
ownership of nonland assets is more equally distributed, even if the wife’s share remains small. In 1996, 
47 percent of nonland assets were jointly owned; this proportion increased to 52 percent in 2006/07. The 
husband’s nonland asset ownership remained steady between 37 and 39 percent in both periods, and the 
wife’s share of the household’s nonland asset portfolio even declined, from 15.5 percent in 1996/97 to 9 
percent in 2006/07. Thus, growth in women’s asset holdings did not necessarily imply that the 
distribution of household assets had become more equal. Indeed, across three out of four asset categories 
(consumer durables, jewelry, and livestock), the wife’s share of the household’s asset portfolio decreased 
over time; although women increased their share of nonagricultural durables owned, they still accounted 
for a small share of the household’s total. At the same time, the share of jointly held jewelry and livestock 
increased significantly over the 10 years between the surveys: the share of jewelry held jointly increased 
from 22 percent to 63 percent, and the share of livestock held jointly increased from 27.6 percent to 36.8 
percent. The implications of this large increase in the proportion of jointly owned assets still need to be 
further understood, particularly in the case of jewelry. 
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Table 3.4—Distribution of major assets across ownership categories, 1996 and 2006/07 
(percentage distribution across ownership categories) 
  1996    2006/07 
  Joint  Husband  Wife    Joint  Husband  Wife 
Land area  16.51  81.55  1.94    12.35  83.68  3.97 
Value of nonland assets  47.42  37.05  15.54    51.85  39.04  9.12 
Consumer durables  60.18  35.13  4.67    55.35  41.71  2.94 
Nonagricultural durables  39.76  58.55  1.68    12.25  85.56  2.19 
Jewelry  22.48  1.43  76.10    63.18  15.49  21.34 
Livestock  27.65  56.17  16.18    36.82  56.18  7.00 
Source: Author’s computations based on survey data. 
Notes: This table is based on 904 households with valid observations in both years. Joint assets are those identified as joint assets 
in the interview; each spouse’s holdings consist of his or her exclusively owned holdings, excluding jointly held assets. 
Negative Shocks and Positive Events 
Households experienced a variety of negative shocks and positive events during the 10 years between the 
surveys. The data on shocks come from both the community questionnaire and the household 
questionnaire. Household-level shocks modules, similar to the module developed in Hoddinott and 
Quisumbing (2003) but modified for the Bangladeshi context, include a list of adverse events and indicate 
whether the household was negatively affected by them. Households were also asked to recall positive 
events that occurred in the same intervening period. Because there may be biases in the household 
reporting of covariate shocks (for example, wealthier households may report higher flood-related losses 
because they had more to lose to begin with), data on covariate shocks come from the community survey. 
Floods are the most important covariate shock in Bangladesh. During the 10 years between the 
surveys, Bangladesh experienced two significant flood events, the 1998 floods, which were widespread in 
scale (del Ninno et al. 2001), and the 2004 floods, which were less severe for the country as a whole 
(even though some individual communities may have been severely affected). Figure 3.1 shows the 
proportions of households affected by floods based on both the community and household surveys. As 
previously discussed, there are striking differences between community and individual reports of flood 
severity. Based on the community survey, 31 percent of households in the agricultural survey sites were 
affected by the 1998 flood, compared to only 8.5 percent by the 2004 flood. In all sites, household self-
reports of flood occurrences for the 1998 floods suggest a lower incidence of flood losses compared to the 
community reports. For the later flood, in contrast, household reports indicate a higher incidence of flood 
losses and are quite close to the community reports. This could indicate a recall problem (especially for 
the earlier floods, which households are less likely to remember compared to the more recent floods) but 
could also reflect measurement error in community surveys. While these differences are interesting and 
sizable, the magnitude of the bias between community and household self-reports cannot be ascertained.  
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Figure 3.1—Flood shocks, community and household reports, 1997–2001 and 2002–2006 
. 
Source: CPRC-DATA-IFPRI Long-Term Impact Study. 
Figure 3.2 presents the proportions of households affected by negative shocks, broken down into 
two five-year periods, 1997–2001 and 2002–2006. For parsimony, only the most important idiosyncratic 
shocks reported by households—dowry and wedding expenses, plus illness and/or death of a household 
member—are presented.
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Figure 3.2—Proportion of households reporting negative shocks, 1997–2001 and 2002–2006 
. 
Source: CPRC-DATA-IFPRI Long-Term Impact Study. 
                                                       
12 The relative frequencies of shocks reported is consistent with the reporting of factors responsible for household decline or 
remaining in poverty obtained from the focus group discussions conducted in a subsample of these sites during Phase I of the 
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Illness (combining expenses related to illness and forgone income) is the most common 
idiosyncratic shock affecting households, followed by dowry and wedding expenses, and then by death. 
Although one could argue that dowry and wedding expenses can be anticipated, the limited availability of 
financial instruments as well as poverty prevent many families from saving adequate amounts to provide 
dowries, so families view these life-cycle events as shocks. Reflecting the aging of the sample, the 
prevalence of illness and death shocks varies across five-year periods, with much higher incidences 
reported in the last five years. Dowry and wedding expenses are also more frequently reported in the later 
period, as daughters reach marriageable ages.  
Figure 3.3 shows the proportions of households reporting positive events, namely, receipt of 
remittances, inheritance, and dowries. The prevalence of positive events is much lower than that of 
negative events, although proportions increase over the two five-year periods. One would expect that as 
children grow up and start working, the proportion of households receiving remittances would increase. 
Similarly, as sons grow up and get married, their parents also start receiving dowries. However, because 
dowries tend to accrue to the newlywed groom rather than his parents, reports of dowry receipts by core 
households (parents) tend to be lower than reports of dowry and wedding expenses. Although inheritance 
reports are higher in the second five-year period, reflecting sample aging, the proportion of households 
reporting inheritance received is low, consistent with the low incidence of death in the sample as a whole. 
Figure 3.3—Proportion of households reporting positive events, 1997–2001 and 2002–2006 
. 
Source: CPRC-DATA-IFPRI Long-Term Impact Study.  
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4.  EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
The subsequent analysis examines how initial asset positions (whether jointly owned, husband-owned, or 
wife-owned assets), shocks experienced by households, baseline individual and household characteristics, 
and characteristics of the community affect asset growth between the baseline and 2006/07 rounds. 
Baseline individual and household characteristics and unobserved community characteristics are 
controlled for because current household characteristics could be affected by the same processes that 
bring about current asset levels. Past values of individual and household characteristics are used to 
eliminate endogeneity bias, and upazila-level (subdistrict) dummies are included to control for 
unobserved community characteristics.  
The empirical specification of this paper draws from the work of Carter et al. (2007), Barrett et al. 
(2006), and Naschold (2008), with adaptations for the specific characteristics of the Bangladeshi datasets. 
The data available include measures of baseline asset stocks (in 1996) and endline asset stocks (in 
2006/07), measures of negative and positive shocks, individual and household characteristics, and 
measures of social networks. To compare the growth of assets of husbands and wives within the same 
household, the analysis is confined to core households that were interviewed in both the baseline and 
recent rounds, where the husband and wife have remained married in the 10-year interval between rounds. 
The empirical specification, which includes polynomial terms in lagged assets up to the fourth 
degree, is similar to Barrett et al. (2006) in including higher-order (up to quartic) terms in lagged assets. 
The empirical specification modifies equation (6) and is similar to Carter et al. (2007) in the inclusion of 
shocks and positive events experienced by households.
13 The asset growth function with polynomial 
terms in lagged assets up to the fourth degree is given by (7): 
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where ln AiT - ln AiB is asset growth for asset owner i from the baseline survey period (B) to the most 
recent survey (T); AiB is assets at the baseline; Θi and Ωi are vectors of negative and positive shocks 
obtained from the retrospective shocks modules; Zi and Ci are time-invariant individual, household, and 
community characteristics; and εit is the error term. These are estimated separately for land and nonland 
assets. 
Because the impacts of shocks may differ depending on initial asset levels and labor and capital 
market conditions, the responses to these shocks, βΘ and βε, are written as functions of initial asset stocks 
Abi, labor market conditions Li, and capital market conditions Ki. Labor market and capital market 
conditions are proxied by upazila dummies. Unlike in Carter et al. (2007), asset and income shocks are 
not distinguished from each other, but the most important negative and positive shocks reported by the 
respondents are included: floods, illness, and death, and remittance, inheritance, and dowry receipts. 
Partly to control for reporting bias in the case of covariate shocks, the village-level proportion of 
households reporting the flood shock in a given year from the community questionnaire is used, rather 
than respondent self-reports. To examine whether shocks have persistent impacts, the shocks are divided 
into two recall periods, 1997–2001 and 2002–2006. The first recall period includes the 1998 floods, and 
the second the 2004 floods. Regression analyses are conducted separately for husband-, wife-, and jointly 
owned assets, and separately for different types of assets. 
This paper also investigates whether households that have access to social networks are better 
able to withstand negative shocks. Although the data contain rich information about membership in 
groups and relationships with influential people (Quisumbing 2009), the sample was designed to evaluate 
the impact of agricultural technologies disseminated through women’s groups, and thus one cannot treat 
                                                       
13 It would have been ideal to have individually reported shocks, but the shocks module was administered at the household 
level owing to budgetary constraints.  
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the number-of-groups or the strength-of-networks variables as exogenous. Instead, this paper uses 
information on husbands’ and wives’ family background—the number of brothers and sisters and the 
distance from the parental village—as indicators that capture social connectedness. Analysts of 
Bangladeshi society have pointed out the importance of the gusti, or the local lineage group composed of 
several related families within a village, which has traditionally formed the basis for the organization of 
agricultural labor and systems of reciprocity in Bangladesh (Lewis and Hossain 2008, 59). In earlier 
analysis using this dataset (Quisumbing 2009), these variables were found to be significant determinants 
of men’s and women’s group membership and strength of relationships with influential people in the 
village.  
Husbands generally have easier access to their familial support networks because they do not 
typically leave their parents’ village to marry. Because of these exogamous marriage patterns, husbands 
live much closer to their parental villages, living 2.97 kilometers away on average, compared to wives, 
who live 9.98 kilometers away (Table 4.1). Siblings also play different, often conflicting, roles for 
husbands and wives. Although Islamic law mandates that sisters inherit half the share of brothers, in 
Bangladesh the former tend to renounce their share of their land inheritance in return for their brothers’ 
support, a practice called naior (Subramanian 1998). Consequently, a sister may act as a drain on a man’s 
resources if he is expected to assist her in times of distress. While brothers may help each other farm 
while their parents are living, owing to the practice of partible inheritance, they are implicitly competitors 
for their parents’ land. Finally, because wives tend to be younger than their husbands, wives in our sample 
have a larger number of living brothers and sisters than do their husbands. 
Table 4.1—Indicators of familial networks, husbands and wives 
Number of siblings and distance to parental village  Mean  Standard deviation 
Husbands 
  Number of living brothers  1.77  1.46 
  Number of living sisters  1.84  1.53 
  Distance to parental village (km)  2.97  29.15 
Wives 
  Number of living brothers  2.26  1.53 
  Number of living sisters  2.20  1.69 
  Distance to parental village (km)  9.98  37.23 
Source: Author’s calculations based on survey data. 
Note: Husbands and wives in intact marriages who were interviewed in both 1996/97 and 2006/07.  
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5.  NONPARAMETRIC RESULTS 
In Figures 5.1 and 5.2, the dynamic asset paths are presented separately for household assets (figures 
taken from Quisumbing and Baulch 2009), jointly owned assets, husband-owned assets, and wife-owned 
assets, for land (in decimals) and nonland assets (in constant 2007 Bangladeshi taka), respectively.
14 The 
land graphs include the sum of cultivated homestead and other owned land measured in decimals. For 
nonland assets, which include agricultural and nonagricultural durables, consumer durables, jewelry, and 
livestock, values have been restricted to the first 95 percentiles of the total nonland asset distribution in all 
the figures that follow. This trimming of the top 5 percentiles of the data was adopted because of the 
presence of a number of implausibly high outliers at the extreme upper end of the distribution (especially 
in the initial years). Inclusion of these observations makes the overall shapes of the dynamic asset paths 
difficult to see. 
Two features of the asset plots are apparent. First, while all the dynamic asset paths for household 
land and nonland asset holdings are nonlinear, none have the elongated S-shape hypothesized by Carter 
and Barrett (2006). Indeed, all have just one point at which they cross the diagonal (from above), 
implying that the equilibrium is stable. This suggests that multiple equilibria and asset-based poverty 
traps do not exist in rural Bangladesh. Second, although the observations (represented by crosses) in these 
diagrams are widely distributed, they do not appear to divide into two groups (toward the bottom left-
hand corners and top right-hand corners of the asset plots), as Carter and Barrett’s theory of bifurcation 
would lead one to expect. Instead, there is a clustering of observations close to the origin, which suggests 
the persistence of minimal asset holdings among a large number of households. However, the existence of 
a unique low-level equilibrium can be viewed as the harshest form of a socially exclusionary process in 
which capital endowments do not permit individuals and households to sustainably overcome obstacles to 
accumulation. The clustering of observations close to the origin is especially marked for women-owned 
land and assets, for which processes of gender-based social exclusion come into play. 
The shapes of the land and nonland assets plots are, however, quite different, and the shapes of 
the plots across ownership categories for a given asset are also quite different. The LOWESS curves for 
land cross the diagonal line close to the origin and lie almost entirely below the diagonal from there on 
(Figure 5.1). This is consistent with the declining annual growth rates for total and cultivated land 
observed in Table 3.3, and the type of partible land inheritance practiced in rural Bangladesh.
15 It also 
seems that the shape of the household land frontier is very similar to the husband’s land frontier, possibly 
because the husband’s land accounts for the major portion of owned land. The wife’s landholdings, 
however, remain fairly flat over time, and even if wives have increased their areas of owned land, in both 
absolute and relative terms, they control very little of families’ landholdings.  
   
                                                       
14 These figures were produced using a LOWESS estimator with optimal bandwidth in Stata 10.  
15 Note that in recent years, the practice of partible inheritance has been modified so that the division of land among 
surviving sons takes place both informally, when sons marry and set up their own households, and formally, upon the father’s 
death (Davis 2007). As Foster and Rosenzweig (2002) have pointed out in the Indian context, whether or not households divide is 
not strictly exogenous.   
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Source: Author’s estimations.  
Note: Scale of axes not uniform across graphs. 
In contrast, the shapes of the nonland asset plots in Figure 5.2 have clear curvature and cross the 
diagonal at somewhat higher values, but remain under the diagonal thereafter, indicating slower asset 
growth for households (and individuals) with higher initial assets. While the shapes of the nonland asset 
frontiers are similar for household, husband-owned, and wife-owned assets, the curve for joint assets is 
quite different, and curves upward, although this may be driven by outliers.  
Figure 5.2—LOWESS plots for nonland assets 
Household assets 
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Figure 5.2—Continued 








Source: Author’s estimations. 
Note: Scale of axes not uniform across graphs.  
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6.  RESULTS FROM PARAMETRIC METHODS 
Land Accumulation Regressions 
Impact of Baseline Characteristics 
Land accumulation regressions, estimated separately for jointly owned, husband-owned, and wife-owned 
land, are presented in Table 6.1. The dependent variable is the difference between the areas of current and 
baseline owned land.
16 The specification with higher-order terms is presented because the null hypothesis 
that they are jointly equal to zero for jointly owned and wife-owned assets is rejected. (The null 
hypothesis that the higher-order terms are equal to zero for husband-owned land cannot be rejected.) 
Table 6.1—Land accumulation regressions: Joint, husband’s, and wife’s land 
    Exclusively held 
  Joint  Husband’s  Wife’s 
Lagged landholdings       
  Land in 1996  0.886**  -0.283  -0.714** 
  (2.20)  (-1.47)  (-2.40) 
  Land in 1996, squared  -0.013***  -0.001  -0.009 
  (-6.58)  (-0.67)  (-0.90) 
  Land in 1996, cubed  0.000***  0.000  0.000 
  (7.88)  (0.74)  (0.79) 
  Land in 1996, quartic  -0.000***  -0.000  -0.000 
  (-8.52)  (-0.74)  (-0.59) 
Covariate shocks (floods)       
  Proportion of households affected, 1997–2001  -0.083  0.028  0.001 
  (-0.82)  (0.25)  (0.05) 
  Proportion of households affected,  2002–2006  0.222  -0.190  0.016 
  (1.29)  (-1.20)  (0.79) 
Idiosyncratic shocks, 1997–2001       
  Any illness in household  -2.209  5.831  1.944 
  (-0.35)  (0.97)  (1.10) 
  Any death in household  23.915  -17.082  8.204 
  (1.58)  (-0.69)  (1.03) 
  Dowry or wedding expenses  20.277*  -9.569  -1.625 
  (1.69)  (-0.81)  (-0.65) 
Idiosyncratic shocks, 2002–2006       
  Any illness in household  -0.622  -9.134  1.708 
  (-0.14)  (-1.22)  (1.67) 
  Any death in household  -2.929  -59.779***  11.343* 
  (-0.28)  (-4.18)  (2.00) 
  Dowry or wedding expenses  -14.243  2.570  2.019 
  (-1.33)  (0.21)  (0.84) 
Positive events, 1997–2001       
  Whether received remittances  13.670  -5.574  5.727 
  (0.88)  (-0.29)  (1.16) 
  Whether received inheritance  -5.103  -11.815  5.622 
  (-0.59)  (-0.37)  (1.12) 
  Whether received dowries  27.529  -18.023  -1.437 
  (1.08)  (-1.06)  (-1.22) 
 
   
                                                       
16 Area of owned land, area, and landholding size are used interchangeably in the discussion of the regression results.  
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Table 6.1—Continued 
    Exclusively held 
   Joint  Husband’s  Wife’s 
RRPositive events, 2002–2006       
  Whether received remittances  33.085*  -6.212  2.411 
  (1.72)  (-0.43)  (0.81) 
  Whether received inheritance  -4.684  -15.736  -2.004 
  (-0.62)  (-0.51)  (-0.52) 
  Whether received dowries  5.473  -9.194  -2.681** 
  (0.58)  (-1.53)  (-2.01) 
Husband’s characteristics       
  Age  2.310  0.196  0.102 
  (1.34)  (0.10)  (0.51) 
  Age squared  -0.020  -0.014  -0.002 
  (-1.48)  (-0.77)  (-0.85) 
  Years of schooling  -0.273  1.296  0.152 
  (-0.33)  (1.19)  (0.86) 
Wife’s characteristics       
  Age  -2.335  5.551**  -0.059 
  (-0.91)  (2.31)  (-0.18) 
  Age squared  0.028  -0.074**  0.001 
  (1.01)  (-2.48)  (0.31) 
  Years of schooling  -0.429  2.853*  -0.465** 
  (-0.29)  (1.90)  (-2.57) 
Household characteristics       
  Household size  0.113  -0.434  0.089 
  (0.10)  (-0.21)  (0.33) 
  Proportion aged 0–4 years  -0.076  0.064  -0.024 
  (-0.45)  (0.26)  (-0.52) 
  Proportion aged 5-14 years  0.017  0.094  0.001 
  (0.12)  (0.54)  (0.04) 
  Proportion aged 15–19 years  0.058  0.077  0.026 
  (0.47)  (0.37)  (0.49) 
  Proportion aged 35–54 years  -0.033  0.001  -0.030 
  (-0.23)  (0.01)  (-0.81) 
  Proportion aged 55 years and over  -0.315*  0.892**  -0.013 
  (-1.87)  (2.38)  (-0.23) 
  Value of nonland assets at baseline  0.001  0.000*  0.000 
  (1.51)  (1.80)  (0.95) 
Upazila dummies (Saturia excluded)       
  Mymensingh  4.297  -3.002  0.627 
  (0.46)  (-0.25)  (0.56) 
  Kishoreganj  -12.316  2.877  0.310 
  (-1.37)  (0.31)  (0.23) 
  Jessore  -7.074  -5.004  2.559* 
  (-0.92)  (-0.60)  (1.89) 
  Constant  -11.119  -62.781  -2.309 
  (-0.66)  (-1.35)  (-0.38) 
Test of coefficients        
  -2<B<0 (t-statistic)  -7.18  -8.94  -4.33 
  p-value  0  0  0.00 
B2=B3=B4=0 (F-statistic)  39.95  0.3  2,158.59 
p-value  0  0.7426  0.00 
Number of observations  729  729  729 
R-squared  0.74  0.40  0.32 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
Notes: Regressions include inverse probability weights to account for attrition; t-statistics are based on robust standard errors. 
*** indicates p < 0.01, ** indicates p < 0.05, and * indicates p < 0.10.  
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Initial landholding sizes are important determinants of asset growth for all categories of land, 
with the exception of husband’s land. Individual and household characteristics have different impacts on 
land accumulation, depending on the identity of the owner. Men whose wives have completed more years 
of schooling are better able to accumulate land, suggesting some complementarity between human and 
natural capital. Men in households with a higher proportion of older individuals also experience faster 
land accumulation, possibly because older males would have died in the survey interval and bequeathed 
their land to husbands. Finally, higher values of nonland assets at baseline are complementary to 
husbands’ land accumulation. In contrast, very few individual and household characteristics significantly 
affect the growth of jointly owned and wife-owned land. Wives who are better educated accumulate land 
more slowly, possibly because they are less likely to be engaged in agriculture. Finally, women are better 
able to accumulate land in Jessore, where women’s NGOs have been particularly active in increasing 
women’s economic and political participation. 
Impact of Shocks 
Flood shocks do not appear to affect land accumulation (Table 6.1). Possibly owing to the effectiveness of 
emergency relief efforts (del Ninno et al. 2001; Quisumbing 2005), households seem to have recovered 
from both recent and more distant flood shocks. Households also seem to have recovered from earlier 
episodes of idiosyncratic shocks, or households experiencing shocks in the earlier period (which may 
temporarily have reduced asset stocks) have engaged in catch-up accumulation behavior. For example, it 
is possible that households that paid out dowry expenses in the earlier period were able to catch up, as 
evidenced by the positive sign of the coefficient on this variable. In contrast, having experienced shocks 
in later periods seem to have reduced asset growth—a more recent death made a major dent in husbands’ 
land accumulation. Possibly because death is a signal for property division and inheritance, having 
experienced a recent death weakly increases the growth of a wife’s land. Recent remittances appear to be 
weakly associated with increased land acquisition, but having received a dowry recently—signaling the 
marriage of a son—decreased a wife’s landholdings. 
Asset Accumulation Regressions 
Impact of Baseline Characteristics 
An analogous specification for asset growth is found in Table 6.2. The dependent variable is the 
difference between the values of baseline and current nonland assets (defined as consumer durables, 
agricultural and nonagricultural durables, jewelry, and livestock). The coefficients on initial assets in 
Table 6.2 are significantly different from zero in the jointly held and husbands’ assets regressions; 
however, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the higher-order terms are jointly equal to zero for 
jointly held and wives’ assets. 
Table 6.2 also shows that some household baseline characteristics are important determinants of 
asset growth. Higher levels of schooling of the husband are associated with faster growth of joint assets, 
but not husband- or wife-owned assets. Household size reduces the growth of husbands’ assets, and the 
proportion of household members ages 35–54 and age 55 and over reduces household asset growth. 
Finally, the significance of upazila dummies indicates the importance of unobserved upazila-level effects, 
with the growth of joint assets lower in all upazilas relative to Saturia (the excluded category), which is 
closest to Dhaka, and the growth of individually owned assets lower in Mymensingh. 
Impact of Shocks 
Table 6.2 confirms that the impact of shocks on nonland asset accumulation differs depending on who 
owns the asset and on the timing of the shock. Flood shocks in 1997–2001 had a weak negative impact on 
jointly owned assets. Husbands’ and wives’ assets seem to have recovered well from illness shocks 
occurring in the earlier five-year period, with wives’ assets showing some catch-up growth (albeit at a  
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weak level of significance), but illness in the more recent five-year period had a negative impact on both 
husbands’ and wives’ assets. (The impact on husbands’ assets is weakly significant at a 10 percent level; 
the impact on wives’ assets is significant at 5 percent.) A more recent death in the household also had a 
negative impact on jointly held assets. Inheritances received in the more distant past built up husbands’ 
and wives’ assets, but not a more recent inheritance, which is associated with a recent death and eventual 
division of property. Dowry or wedding expenses had a weak positive impact on husbands’ assets 
(possibly indicating reporting bias), while recent dowry receipts increased growth in joint asset holdings.  
Table 6.2—Asset accumulation regressions: Joint, husband’s, and wife’s nonland assets 
(including livestock) 
    Exclusively held 
  Joint  Husband’s  Wife’s 
Lagged assets       
  Initial assets in 1996  -1.282*  0.297  -0.461 
  (-1.80)  (0.85)  (-0.71) 
  Initial assets, squared  0.000  -0.000**  0.000 
  (0.46)  (-2.50)  (0.20) 
  Initial assets, cubed  -0.000  0.000*  -0.000 
  (-0.39)  (1.97)  (-0.52) 
  Initial assets, quartic  0.000  -0.000*  0.000 
  (0.53)  (-1.71)  (0.73) 
Covariate shocks (floods)       
  Proportion of households affected, 1997–2001  -112.389*  92.637  54.192 
  (-1.70)  (1.31)  (1.55) 
  Proportion of households affected, 2002–2006  31.539  -11.600  44.120 
  (0.38)  (-0.18)  (0.81) 
Idiosyncratic shocks, 1997–2001       
  Any illness in household  -6,309.632  4,973.462  5,303.696* 
  (-1.39)  (1.57)  (1.84) 
  Any death in household  -1,163.294  -5,870.762  -2,142.886 
  (-0.18)  (-1.04)  (-0.49) 
  Dowry or wedding expenses  -2,958.423  -10,924.139**  -3,833.915 
  (-0.45)  (-2.14)  (-1.01) 
Idiosyncratic shocks, 2002–2006       
  Any illness in household  -1,447.611  -4,755.185*  -3,849.202** 
  (-0.38)  (-1.72)  (-2.16) 
  Any death in household  -13,400.676**  -6,959.191  -4,361.174 
  (-2.33)  (-1.28)  (-1.64) 
  Dowry or wedding expenses  -1,423.589  10,164.464*  4,515.450 
  (-0.20)  (1.80)  (1.26) 
Positive events, 1997–2001       
  Whether received remittances  -459.821  -5,368.244  506.202 
  (-0.08)  (-1.02)  (0.12) 
  Whether received inheritance  1,783.691  42,832.933**  15,400.884*** 
  (0.18)  (2.61)  (3.18) 
  Whether received dowries  7,385.711  5,325.161  7,887.819 
  (0.52)  (0.73)  (1.06) 
Positive events, 2002–2006       
  Whether received remittances  6,388.694  3,961.602  4,185.985 
  (1.11)  (0.64)  (0.94) 
  Whether received inheritance  -10,641.439  -36,502.561***  -8,895.578*** 
  (-1.25)  (-2.81)  (-2.93) 
  Whether received dowries  9,766.419*  1,006.232  -1,451.262 
  (1.72)  (0.27)  (-0.47) 
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Table 6.2—Continued 
    Exclusively held 
  Joint  Husband’s  Wife’s 
Husband’s characteristics       
  Age  1,182.343  -244.162  174.297 
  (1.12)  (-0.37)  (0.39) 
  Age squared  -11.009  1.714  -1.831 
  (-1.44)  (0.32)  (-0.54) 
  Years of schooling  2,122.289***  839.949  89.404 
  (3.98)  (1.21)  (0.30) 
Wife’s characteristics       
  Age  1,377.477  -1,382.472  -1,145.497** 
  (1.46)  (-1.15)  (-2.15) 
  Age squared  -15.389  23.243  15.686** 
  (-1.40)  (1.39)  (2.34) 
  Years of schooling  1,049.051  893.126*  139.114 
  (1.33)  (1.80)  (0.36) 
Household characteristics       
  Household size  1,702.966  -1,334.298**  -427.470 
  (1.60)  (-2.08)  (-0.90) 
  Proportion aged 0–4 years  -296.448*  -26.977  -84.277 
  (-1.99)  (-0.18)  (-0.83) 
  Proportion aged 5-14 years  -286.593**  90.011  -24.552 
  (-2.15)  (0.92)  (-0.39) 
  Proportion aged 15–19 years  -293.637*  -58.708  -94.480 
  (-1.90)  (-0.45)  (-1.32) 
  Proportion aged 35–54 years  -325.487**  20.560  100.464 
  (-2.46)  (0.22)  (1.56) 
  Proportion aged 55 years and over  -241.742*  -129.155  -102.280 
  (-1.92)  (-1.09)  (-1.21) 
  Landholdings at baseline  -2.781  7.631  11.846 
  (-0.08)  (0.54)  (0.12) 
Upazila dummies (Saturia excluded)       
  Mymensingh  -15,009.847***  -12,095.606***  -5,673.639** 
  (-3.58)  (-2.76)  (-2.10) 
  Kishoreganj  -27,586.349***  2,493.002  1,626.646 
  (-5.22)  (0.47)  (0.57) 
  Jessore  -17,382.530***  -1,095.914  839.856 
  (-3.25)  (-0.23)  (0.33) 
  Constant  -13,879.156  38,494.112***  24,319.258** 
  (-0.63)  (2.87)  (2.35) 
Test of coefficients        
  -2<B<0 (t-statistic)  -1.01  -6.53  -2.38 
  p-value  0.32  0.00  0.02 
B2=B3=B4=0 (F-statistic)  0.21  6.24  0.04 
p-value  0.65  0.02  0.84 
Number of observations  728  728  728 
R-squared  0.17  0.26  0.14 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
Notes: Regressions include inverse probability weights to account for attrition; t-statistics are based on robust standard errors. 
*** indicates p < 0.01, ** indicates p < 0.05, and * indicates p < 0.10. 
Impact of Shocks by Type of Asset 
The above results do not reveal how households and individuals adjust their asset portfolios in response to 
shocks. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 present the coefficients of the shock variables on the growth of different 
categories of durable goods (Table 6.3), livestock, and jewelry (both in Table 6.4). Floods experienced in 
1997–2001 reduced growth in joint holdings of consumer durables. Earlier illness shocks reduced wives’ 
holdings of agricultural durables as well as joint holdings of nonagricultural durables, although these 
coefficients are only weakly significant at 10 percent. Deaths experienced in the household, however, had 
negative impacts on jointly held durable goods, with larger impacts for more recent deaths. Earlier deaths  
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reduced jointly held agricultural durables, while more recent deaths reduced all types of jointly held 
durables but increased wives’ holdings of consumer durables. Dowry and wedding expenses in the earlier 
period had a weak negative impact on husbands’ consumer durables but a strong negative impact on 
husbands’ agricultural durables. In Bangladeshi society, providing a good dowry for a daughter is viewed 
as the father’s responsibility—even if it requires the sale of productive equipment. 
Remittances in 1997–2001 did not significantly affect holdings of durables, but later remittances 
are significantly associated with growth in jointly held consumer durables. Husbands’ consumer durables 
clearly benefited from earlier inheritance receipts, but later inheritance receipts were associated with 
lower growth in the husband’s consumer durables and nonagricultural durables. This might be because 
inheritance receipts also signal the death of the parent and property division, and possible loss of access to 
familial assets. Finally, dowry receipts were a mixed blessing for parents: although later receipts 
increased jointly held consumer durables, dowry receipts in both periods were also associated with lower 
holdings of jointly held agricultural durables, possibly because they were given to the newly married son 
to start a new household.  
Jewelry and livestock are often mentioned as risk-coping instruments because they are relatively 
easy to dispose of in an emergency. Yet, Table 6.3 shows that different types of shocks affect holdings of 
these assets in different ways. Earlier flood shocks increase growth of women’s livestock holdings, 
possibly owing to a replacement or catch-up effect. Earlier illness shocks are also associated with higher 
growth in husbands’ livestock holdings, while later illness shocks reduce husbands’ livestock holdings 
(there are negative impacts on wives’ holdings, but these are not statistically significant). A death in the 
household, however, reduces jointly held jewelry and the husband’s livestock holdings, but unexpectedly 
increases the wife’s livestock holdings. Remittances do not appear to be channeled toward either livestock 
or jewelry, tending instead to be invested in durable goods purchases (see Table 6.2). Earlier inheritance 
receipts have a positive impact on husbands’ livestock holdings, but later receipts decrease those 
holdings, again because they are linked to parental death. Similar to the results for consumer durables, 
later dowry receipts end up reducing wives’ livestock holdings (possibly because the marriage of a son 
may have resulted in gifts of livestock to start him off) as well as wives’ jewelry, but also result in 
increases in household jewelry holdings. It is possible that the entrance of a bride to the household 
increases household jewelry holdings, but at the expense of the wife’s assets, which could have been used 
to finance wedding expenses. 
Impact of Shocks on Gender Asset Inequality 
Table 6.5 presents the impact of shocks on the difference between the husband’s and wife’s asset growth 
within the same household—a positive coefficient indicates that the husband’s assets grew (increasing 
gender asset inequality, given the initial distribution that favors husbands), while a negative coefficient 
implies a reduction in gender asset inequality. Similar to previous results, the impact of shocks is quite 
nuanced. Flood shocks do not appear to have any net impact on gender asset inequality. Idiosyncratic 
shocks and life-cycle events appear to have offsetting impacts on the gender asset gap within the 
household. While the death of a household member and dowry and wedding expenses end up reducing the 
growth of the husband’s relative to the wife’s assets—implying that husbands’ assets bear the brunt of 
these shocks—earlier inheritance tends to benefit the husband’s asset accumulation relative to that of the 
wife, while later inheritance increases the wife’s asset accumulation relative to that of the husband. 
Because wives tend to be younger, on average, than husbands, earlier inheritance receipts may signal the 
husband receiving an inheritance, and later receipts, the wife. While illness takes a toll on both husbands’ 
and wives’ assets, it does not necessarily increase gender asset inequality, because both spouses’ asset 
stocks are negatively affected.  
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Table 6.3—Impact of shocks on change in value of durable goods, by type of asset ownership 
  Consumer durables    Agricultural durables    Nonagricultural durables 
  Joint  Husband  Wife    Joint  Husband  Wife    Joint  Husband  Wife 
Covariate shocks (floods)                      
  Proportion of households affected, 
1997–2001  -58.161**  0.324  -6.979 
 
-9.300  0.956  -0.003 
 
-11.346  63.389  -0.276 
  (-2.44)  (0.01)  (-1.11)    (-1.39)  (0.25)  (-0.06)    (-1.61)  (1.60)  (-0.43) 
  Proportion of households affected, 
2002–2006  -21.049  -9.528  -5.581* 
 
-0.911  -5.042  0.003 
 
9.144  27.292  0.516 
  (-0.83)  (-0.36)  (-1.71)    (-0.14)  (-0.89)  (0.05)    (0.93)  (1.15)  (0.67) 
Idiosyncratic shocks, 1997–2001                       
  Any illness in household  -954.844  502.546  -96.748    -304.786  236.288  -3.400*    -360.595*  41.068  105.472 
  (-0.79)  (0.60)  (-0.83)    (-1.22)  (0.96)  (-1.68)    (-1.70)  (0.03)  (0.83) 
  Any death in household  234.960  -1,956.274  61.833    -263.605*  -206.758  -7.267    220.705  -728.400  144.594 
  (0.08)  (-1.01)  (0.15)    (-1.70)  (-1.22)  (-0.62)    (0.48)  (-0.95)  (0.97) 
  Dowry or wedding expenses  -1,414.743  -2,971.027*  -607.115    586.827  -833.280**  -12.964    245.467  -2,762.130  35.527 
  (-0.68)  (-1.79)  (-1.02)    (0.73)  (-2.51)  (-0.80)    (0.54)  (-1.33)  (0.98) 
Idiosyncratic shocks, 2002–2006                       
  Any illness in household  -1,285.271  63.841  133.054    -39.244  -126.500  2.048    704.910  -1,880.356  9.199 
  (-1.12)  (0.08)  (0.90)    (-0.16)  (-0.72)  (0.54)    (1.63)  (-1.10)  (0.28) 
  Any death in household  -4,103.672***  -1,316.157  1,107.579***    -407.894*  -342.255***  53.536*    -719.770**  -1,385.398  -99.266* 
  (-2.70)  (-0.63)  (3.05)    (-1.80)  (-2.96)  (1.85)    (-2.62)  (-0.93)  (-1.76) 
  Dowry or wedding expenses  -815.105  1,527.927  587.328    -863.518  488.125  12.068    273.770  3,088.742  -63.222 
  (-0.53)  (0.89)  (1.04)    (-1.23)  (1.17)  (0.74)    (0.87)  (1.40)  (-1.60) 
Positive events, 1997–2001                       
  Whether received remittances  -180.963  -1,347.915  1,789.400    -386.349  -117.275  13.186    -481.267  -1,479.602  -15.094 
  (-0.06)  (-0.97)  (1.17)    (-0.93)  (-0.58)  (0.93)    (-1.33)  (-0.69)  (-0.35) 
  Whether received inheritance  921.010  6,983.064**  158.045    -660.881  450.814  8.455    -35.736  25,056.364  -168.376 
  (0.23)  (2.19)  (0.37)    (-1.48)  (1.02)  (0.60)    (-0.10)  (1.66)  (-0.95) 
  Whether received dowries  983.001  228.207  -174.176    -1,148.776**  232.419  1.984    -781.242**  -1,651.210  117.977 
  (0.26)  (0.10)  (-1.06)    (-2.64)  (0.67)  (0.60)    (-2.09)  (-1.21)  (1.16) 
Positive events, 2002-2006                       
  Whether received remittances  7,385.616**  2,626.797  102.021    302.361  915.984  1.525    499.234  -323.270  129.229 
  (2.48)  (0.76)  (0.41)    (0.36)  (1.41)  (0.60)    (0.52)  (-0.43)  (1.38) 
  Whether received inheritance  -5,617.243  -5,382.978**  -264.106    196.430  -686.649  -14.752    -525.551  -23,810.927*  210.639 
  (-1.46)  (-2.13)  (-0.62)    (0.60)  (-1.54)  (-1.01)    (-1.33  (-1.92)  (1.35) 
  Whether receive dowries  3,393.055*  -61.150  -131.178    -529.409***  -336.705  -7.354    1,316.802  -757.710  12.171 
  (1.79)  (-0.06)  (-0.77)    (-3.16)  (-1.15)  (-1.67)    (1.07)  (-0.87)  (0.31) 
Number of observations  728  728  728    728  728  728    728  728  728 
R-squared  0.27  0.29  0.31    0.89  0.95  0.61    0.61  0.15  0.37 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
Notes: Regressions included linear, squared, cubed, and quartic terms in the specific type of asset, age and schooling of the household head and spouse, household size and 
proportions in age categories, total area of owned land, and upazila dummies. All regressors use baseline (1996) values. Robust t-statistics based on standard errors clustered on 
village are in parentheses. Regressions are weighted using inverse probability weights to account for attrition. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.    
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Table 6.4—Impact of shocks on change in value of jewelry and livestock, by type of asset ownership 
 
Jewelry    Livestock 
Joint  Husband  Wife    Joint  Husband  Wife 
Covariate shocks (floods)               
  Proportion of households affected, 1997–2001  20.835  5.477  38.054    -45.787  15.340  20.538** 
  (0.69)  (0.55)  (1.57)    (-1.06)  (0.61)  (2.33) 
  Proportion of households affected, 2002–2006  -6.664  -20.953  16.060    39.133  23.031  8.709 
  (-0.16)  (-1.50)  (0.62)    (0.90)  (0.63)  (1.29) 
Idiosyncratic shocks, 1997–2001               
  Any illness in household  -2,494.918  830.777  1,534.369    -2,031.447  3,795.051*  -176.530 
  (-1.38)  (1.06)  (0.88)    (-0.98)  (1.84)  (-0.34) 
  Any death in household  -918.276  -1,474.131*  -112.146    -1,716.856  -2,674.093  294.023 
  (-0.29)  (-1.85)  (-0.09)    (-0.58)  (-0.73)  (0.22) 
  Dowry or wedding expenses  -1,877.299  -561.246  -1,124.886    -181.976  -2,323.418  -1,270.186 
  (-0.64)  (-1.02)  (-1.09)    (-0.08)  (-0.73)  (-1.20) 
Idiosyncratic shocks, 2002–2006               
  Any illness in household  -1,331.785  -330.129  -1,303.159    -575.408  -2,289.717*  -90.125 
  (-0.97)  (-0.80)  (-1.42)    (-0.31)  (-1.74)  (-0.24) 
  Any death in household  -4,805.734*  940.841  -116.942    -2,429.156  -4,540.669**  3,156.618** 
  (-1.89)  (0.45)  (-0.13)    (-1.20)  (-2.03)  (2.35) 
  Dowry or wedding expenses  2,573.971  -674.127  98.786    -1,719.660  3,643.544  1,668.503* 
  (0.82)  (-1.26)  (0.15)    (-0.76)  (1.10)  (1.74) 
Positive events, 1997–2001               
  Whether received remittances  2,045.278  -42.635  631.752    912.548  -1,046.735  395.973 
  (0.62)  (-0.09)  (0.46)    (0.42)  (-0.36)  (0.43) 
  Whether received inheritance  1,554.339  -589.595  2,430.541    1,903.784  12,964.682***  -699.783 
  (0.37)  (-0.67)  (1.15)    (0.54)  (3.45)  (-0.37) 
  Whether received dowries  11,504.236  -487.976  1,142.203    -4,019.076  7,519.664  -350.420 
  (1.13)  (-1.42)  (0.55)    (-1.36)  (1.29)  (-1.23) 
Positive events, 2002–2006               
  Whether received remittances  -918.148  987.045  3,300.460    -1,225.832  -0.266  872.502 
  (-0.43)  (0.54)  (0.97)    (-0.48)  (-0.00)  (1.00) 
  Whether received inheritance  -3,200.287  -871.334  -1,913.604    -2,717.360  -6,911.920***  20.214 
  (-0.89)  (-0.95)  (-1.08)    (-0.90)  (-3.34)  (0.01) 
  Whether received dowries  8,213.257**  2,017.967  -1,452.965***    -2,294.526  35.640  -959.553** 
  (2.32)  (1.12)  (-2.85)    (-0.90)  (0.01)  (-2.66) 
Number of observations  728  728  728    728  728  728 
R-squared  0.14  0.08  0.16     0.13  0.14  0.45 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
Notes: Regressions included linear, squared, cubed, and quartic terms in the specific type of asset, age and schooling of the household head and spouse, household size and 
proportions in age categories, total area of owned land, and upazila dummies. All regressors use baseline (1996) values. Robust t-statistics based on standard errors clustered on 
village are in parentheses. Regressions are weighted using inverse probability weights to account for attrition. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.    
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Table 6.5—Impact of shocks on gender asset inequality 






durables  Jewelry  Livestock 
Covariate shocks (floods)               
  Proportion of households affected,1997-2001  0.083  46.880  11.539  1.382  63.140  -36.951  -10.315 
  (0.64)  (0.91)  (0.32)  (0.37)  (1.61)  (-1.16)  (-0.37) 
  Proportion of households affected, 2002–2006  -0.201  -36.845  -6.088  -5.022  26.717  -35.400  22.519 
  (-1.36)  (-1.00)  (-0.20)  (-0.94)  (1.11)  (-1.08)  (0.60) 
Idiosyncratic shocks, 1997–2001               
  Any illness in household  5.809  -286.634  -16.770  164.263  -27.793  -780.103  4,078.859 
  (0.95)  (-0.09)  (-0.02)  (0.68)  (-0.02)  (-0.38)  (1.61) 
  Any death in household  -25.324  -4,148.011*  -2,358.590  -160.575  -917.706  -1,259.436  -2,575.204 
  (-0.97)  (-1.96)  (-1.11)  (-0.91)  (-1.20)  (-0.79)  (-0.64) 
  Dowry or wedding expenses  -5.667  -7,281.293*  -2,038.305  -781.556**  -2,817.564  969.839  -1,266.779 
  (-0.45)  (-1.97)  (-1.09)  (-2.21)  (-1.36)  (0.78)  (-0.46) 
Idiosyncratic shocks, 2002–2006               
  Any illness in household  -11.488  -1,163.359  -31.061  -47.880  -1,916.637  956.194  -2,391.962 
  (-1.58)  (-0.70)  (-0.04)  (-0.30)  (-1.10)  (0.89)  (-1.60) 
  Any death in household  -69.632***  -3,016.305  -2,186.917  -391.490***  -1,329.082  874.776  -7,270.088** 
  (-4.08)  (-0.66)  (-0.99)  (-3.18)  (-0.86)  (0.35)  (-2.43) 
  Dowry or wedding expenses  0.594  6,227.074  901.234  361.380  3,142.028  -1,013.031  2,531.240 
  (0.05)  (1.49)  (0.47)  (0.80)  (1.43)  (-1.17)  (0.91) 
Positive events, 1997–2001               
  Whether received remittances  -7.961  -6,470.281**  -3,263.675  -172.795  -1,503.950  -1,309.679  -1,422.016 
  (-0.34)  (-2.26)  (-1.45)  (-0.88)  (-0.68)  (-0.87)  (-0.47) 
  Whether received inheritance  -10.860  27,993.952*  6,826.062**  466.877  25,169.707  -3,076.896  12,748.712*** 
  (-0.31)  (1.96)  (2.39)  (1.10)  (1.64)  (-1.63)  (2.96) 
  Whether received dowries  -17.796  -2,313.492  301.627  155.188  -1,238.908  -1,509.826  7,964.018 
  (-1.05)  (-0.51)  (0.13)  (0.55)  (-0.83)  (-0.74)  (1.29) 
Positive events, 2002–2006               
  Whether received remittances  -8.402  411.225  1,936.516  936.876  -449.353  -2,489.639  -627.064 
  (-0.53)  (0.09)  (0.56)  (1.44)  (-0.58)  (-0.71)  (-0.21) 
  Whether received inheritance  -24.930  -27,752.257**  -5,055.785**  -677.155  -23,925.491*  1,162.753  -6,336.618** 
  (-0.72)  (-2.29)  (-2.49)  (-1.56)  (-1.90)  (0.83)  (-2.52) 
  Whether received dowries  -5.681  2,178.710  4.993  -286.055  -808.736  3,417.190*  839.472 
  (-0.86)  (1.01)  (0.00)  (-1.09)  (-0.93)  (1.69)  (0.33) 
Number of observations  729  728  728  728  728  728  728 
R-squared  0.42  0.35  0.32  0.95  0.15  0.15  0.22 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
Notes: Regressions included linear, squared, cubed, and quartic terms in the specific type of asset, age and schooling of the household head and spouse, household size and 
proportions in age categories, total area of owned land, and upazila dummies. All regressors use baseline (1996) values. Robust t-statistics based on standard errors clustered on 
village are in parentheses. Regressions are weighted using inverse probability weights to account for attrition. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.  
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Social Networks and Differential Asset Growth 
Table 6.6 presents selected coefficients of the effect of social network determinants on land and asset 
growth, separately for jointly and exclusively held assets, as well as for the difference between the 
husband’s and wife’s asset growth within the same household. Brothers and sisters play different roles in 
familial networks. Because husbands’ brothers compete for parental land, a greater number of brothers 
decreases the husband’s land accumulation and reduces the husband–wife land accumulation gap. 
Because husbands are expected to provide for their sisters, the latter may act as a drain on their brothers’ 
resources yet not compete for parental land. Indeed, the impact of husbands’ sisters is ambiguous—
having more sisters reduces jointly held land (which may typically have been acquired after marriage) but 
increases the land that the husband claims as his own, coming primarily through inheritance. Husbands’ 
having more sisters also increases the gap between husband and wife in land accumulation. The wife’s 
number of sisters does not affect land or asset accumulation by either husband or wife. Finally, a greater 
distance from the wife’s parental village reduces her husband’s land accumulation. Familial networks—
mostly the wife’s—also have an impact on the accumulation of nonland assets. The wife’s brothers, 
however, are clearly an important part of her social network. A husband’s nonland asset accumulation is 
lower the more brothers his wife has, and the nonland gender asset gap is smaller. In contrast, possibly 
because other sisters compete with the wife for their brothers’ support, or wives may also have to come to 
their sisters’ aid, nonland asset growth of husbands relative to wives is faster if wives have more sisters. 
Finally, indicating the importance of support from the wife’s kinship network, a greater distance from the 
wife’s village is associated with lower growth of jointly held assets.  
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Table 6.6—Impact of network determinants on land and asset accumulation, by type of ownership 
  Land    Nonland assets 




Joint  Husband  Wife 
Husband-
Wife 
Husband’s network determinants                   
  Husband’s brothers  0.541  -5.251**  0.373  -5.231***    -437.255  615.786  529.477  -93.699 
  (0.34)  (-2.67)  (1.04)  (-2.73)    (-0.49)  (0.65)  (0.93)  (-0.14) 
  Husband’s sisters  -2.630**  3.757*  -0.066  4.268*    -759.804  -1,151.145  -584.468  -525.222 
  (-2.02)  (1.69)  (-0.17)  (1.79)    (-0.81)  (-1.42)  (-1.16)  (-1.07) 
  Distance to parental village of 
husband 
0.015  0.058  0.029**  -0.033    -4.857  79.406  67.535  12.298 
  (0.53)  (0.58)  (2.41)  (-0.35)    (-0.12)  (1.28)  (1.03)  (0.51) 
Wife’s network determinants                   
  Wife’s brothers  -0.822  -1.425  -0.087  -1.444    1,116.351  -1,394.890*  -773.998  -779.583* 
  (-0.77)  (-0.92)  (-0.31)  (-0.91)    (1.18)  (-2.01)  (-1.14)  (-1.73) 
  Wife’s sisters  -0.913  2.338  -0.342  2.732    -1,529.337  911.761  442.841  672.101* 
  (-1.02)  (1.27)  (-1.62)  (1.46)    (-1.07)  (1.26)  (0.80)  (1.82) 
  Distance to parental village of wife  -0.028  -0.131**  -0.015  -0.092    -59.749***  -13.142  -14.605  -1.727 
  (-1.21)  (-2.50)  (-1.66)  (-1.45)    (-4.06)  (-0.75)  (-1.11)  (-0.16) 
Number of observations  722  722  722  722    722  722  722   
R-squared  0.68  0.40  0.32  0.42    0.18  0.27  0.15   
Source: Author’s estimations. 
Notes: Regressions included linear, squared, cubed, and quartic terms in the specific type of asset, negative shocks and positive events, age and schooling of the household head 
and spouse, household size and proportions in age categories, total area of owned land, and upazila dummies. All regressors use baseline (1996) values. Robust t-statistics based on 




7.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This exploration into the dynamics of jointly and individually owned assets suggests that the asset 
accumulation paths of individuals may be quite different from those of households. While analysis of the 
gender-disaggregated asset data does not support the existence of multiple equilibria, the clustering of a 
large number of observations near the origin is indicative of many households—and individuals, 
particularly women—being trapped in asset poverty. The analysis of the impact of shocks on jointly 
owned and individually owned assets also suggests that men’s and women’s assets respond differently to 
some types of shocks, with a husband’s land being reduced by a death in the household and his assets 
drawn down to cope with dowry and wedding expenses. Both men’s and women’s assets are reduced by 
illness shocks. Life-cycle events also affect land and asset accumulation of men and women, with more 
recent events having different impacts than events in the more distant past. Factors that affect husbands’ 
and wives’ ability to form social and familial networks also affect asset accumulation: the gender asset-
accumulation gap is smaller in households where wives have more brothers (who provide her with 
support) and fewer sisters. Households that live closer to the wife’s parental village are also better able to 
acquire jointly held assets. Put differently, factors that encourage the formation or maintenance of social 
networks for women also reduce gender asset inequality. 
The negative impact of dowry and wedding expenses and illness shocks on a variety of outcomes 
related to individual and household well-being has been documented using both qualitative and 
quantitative analyses of the longitudinal data (Quisumbing 2010; Baulch and Davis 2008). Baulch and 
Davis (2008), using both life history and quantitative survey data from this study, find that improvements 
in poor people’s lives tend to happen gradually, whereas sudden declines are common. They find that a 
crisis is likely to produce a serious and sudden decline when the crisis either directly damages something 
constitutive of a person’s well-being, such as his or her health, or when a person has very few buffers and 
low resilience (due to previous crises, limited or no ability to insure, few assets or savings, and poor 
network resources). The downward pressure exerted on people’s life trajectories are particularly severe 
when two or three shocks occur within the space of a few years (for example, if high medical expenses for 
treating an elderly parent coincide with dowry and wedding expenses for a daughter).  
These results suggest three areas of potential policy significance: providing health insurance, 
providing mechanisms to save for anticipated life-cycle events, and addressing the elimination of dowries. 
Providing some form of health insurance to protect against illness shocks is a recommendation that 
emerges clearly from this work; some large NGOs, such as BRAC, are exploring the provision of micro–
health insurance schemes. Yet the recognition that illness shocks can be detrimental to poor people’s 
well-being appears to receive less attention in Bangladesh than covariate shocks such as floods, precisely 
because illness is an idiosyncratic event. This should not lead policymakers to underestimate the 
detrimental impact of illness on people’s livelihoods and ability to move out of poverty; Krishna’s (2010) 
study of household poverty dynamics in societies as diverse as India, Kenya, Uganda, Peru, and the 
United States identifies illness and accidents as the most common and preventable cause of poverty.  
Providing households with the ability to save and invest, particularly when positive shocks occur, 
might help build up their stock of assets and enable them to prepare for anticipated life-cycle events, such 
as endowing the next generation with assets, which is one interpretation of dowries. But this begs the 
question of whether dowries are, in themselves, desirable. While providing the poor with savings 
instruments could be one solution to mitigate the impact of dowry shocks, it does not address the other 
social implications of dowries. Although South Asian governments, including the government of 
Bangladesh, have attempted to curb dowries, the practice has continued to be widespread and may even 
be on the rise (Davis and Bach 2010). Some authors (notably Botticini and Siow 2003) have argued that 
dowries will disappear as labor markets develop and children become less dependent on their families’ 
assets for their livelihoods. The pernicious effects of dowries on the poor, however, imply that one cannot 
wait for this evolutionary process to reach its conclusion. As Davis and Bach (2010) argue, anti-dowry 
policy must be seen as an antipoverty initiative that also serves to reduce the oppression of women. As  
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there is widespread reluctance to address this deeply rooted cultural practice in government and policy 
circles, innovative approaches to eliminate dowries are needed that go beyond national economic policies 
and involve NGOs and civil society.
17 At the same time, government needs to continue providing 
incentives to invest in women’s human capital—through schooling, conditional cash transfers, and other 
programs—and to increase returns on women’s human capital by removing barriers to labor market 
participation. Legal reform to strengthen women’s inheritance and property rights will also provide a 
stronger foundation for women’s asset accumulation and the eventual reduction of gender asset 
inequality. 
                                                       
17 For example, the Grameen Bank does not allow its members to provide or receive dowries (though it has also been 
observed that some families have used loans to pay for dowries).  
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